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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No,
17527

-vsSAVADOR E. PACHECO,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-404 (1978),

for the taking of two checks totalling $405,76 made out to
Allstate Wholesale Distributing Company,
DISPOSITJON IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury on December 16
and 17, 1981 in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah,
the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding.

A verdict of guilty

was returned by the jury on December 17, 1981 and on December
22, 1981 appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term
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not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment and
sentence rendered by the trial court.
All citations contained herein are to Utah Code
Annotated, Replacement Volume BB (1978), unless otherwise
indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 28, 1980, Mr. Charles Fultz, president of
Allstates Distributing, a local tire company, received one
check in the amount of $292.14 and a second check in the
amount of $113.62 for the purchase of tires (T,8).

Mr. Fultz

placed these two checks under the handle of a cash box which
he kept in an inner office at his business (T,8),
Later during the same day, Mr, Fultz returned to
the office area of his business from the rear of the warehouse
and discovered a man later identified as the appellant standinc
approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the area where the
cash box was located ( T, 11) ,

The appe 11 ant asked Mr, Fultz

about the possibility of obtaining employment, was told none
was available, and left through the front door

(T.12),

approximately 5:30 p.m. on July 28, Mr, Fultz discovered
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At

that the two checks that he had placed on the cash box were
missing (T.12).

Appellant was later apprehended and found

to have both missing checks in his pants pocket (T,19-20),
Appellant's defense at trial was based upon his
testimony that he obtained the checks inadvertently at
Allstates Distributing and did not appreciate their true
significance because of an alleged inability to understand
the English language and American banking instruments (T,55-

56),

Despite appellant's testimony and his use of an

interpreter at trial, the State introduced evidence that
appellant conversed in English to Mr, Fultz (T,12) and
Detective Riedel (T.20).
Counsel for appellant at trial vigorously submitted
a novel theory of value of the stolen property to the trial
judge.

Counsel contended that since the checks were not

endorsed by the owner, Mr, Fultz, at the time they were
stolen, they had no value and, therefore, could not support
a third degree felony charge.

The trial judge rejected

appellant's argument and found that the face amount of the
checks was prima facie evidence of value,
Despite the trial judge's ruling, appellant was
subsequently permitted to introduce expert testimony from

Ms, Mary Lou Vrabec, a Salt Lake bank employee, in support

-3-
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of his theory.

Where testifying that the checks had no

value prior to the moment they were endorsed and negotiated,
Ms, Vrabec admitted on cross-examination that the value of
the checks to the owner "prior to processing" was the face
value of the checks (T,46-50),
Based upon the evidence presented, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of theft, a third degree felony,
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION.
Appellant was charged by infonnation with a third
degree felony in violation of § 76-6-412(1) (b) (i), which
provides:

(1) Theft of property and services
as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable as follows:
(b)

As a felony of the third degree

if:
(i)
The value of the property or
services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000.
The property stolen by appellant in the instant case was two
checks having face amounts totalling $405.76.

At the close

of the State's case, appellant moved to amend the information
on the grounds that the prosecution had failed to establish that
the value of the checks was between $250.00 and $1,000.00
(T.28).

Appellant's theory was that since the checks were

not endorsed by the payee at the time they were stolen, they
had no value.

The trial court denied appellant's motion after

lengthy discussion with defense counsel.
Appellant then called Mary Lou Vrabec, a local bank
employee, who testified that the checks were of no value at the
moment they were stolen because of the missing endorsements.
kppellant contends that this evidence was unrebutted and,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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therefore, the trial court was bound to grant appellant's
motion.

Respondent maintains that appellant's argument

must fail because the face amount of the checks was prima
facie evidence of value and provided the jury with
evidence upon which to base their verdict.
In People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262,

520 P.2d

113 (1974), the Colorado Supreme Court stated,
[T]he prima facie value of a check
is its face value.
First National Bank
v. Montgomery Cotton Co., 211 Ala. 551,
101 So. 186.
This rule comports with the
general rule that value in a theft case
is market value, where market value is
what a willing buyer will pay in cash to
the true owner for the stolen item.
Maisel v. People, 166 Colo. 161, 442 P.2d
399.
Where a check is the thing to be
valued, the willing buyer is normally the
drawee bank.
In the overwhelming
majority of ordinary commercial transactions, the drawee bank will pay the face
amount of the instrument, or the drawer
will make good the instrument.
E. Fransworth & J. Honnold, Cases and Materials
on Commercial Law, 47-54 (2d ed. 1968).
Therefore, we hold that the face amount
of the instrument is presumptive evidence
of its value (citations omitted).
The value of the thing lost is not limited
to what the thief could realize on the
instrument.
As we pointed out above, the
loss is measured by what the owner could
expect to receive for the instrument.
520 P.2d at 116-117 (emphasis added).

See also:

States v. Aberico, 604 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir.

1979).
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The analysis of the Colorado Supreme Court in
Marques is a logical extension of this Court's decision
in State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977), cited by
appellant in support of his argument.

In Logan, this

Court adopted the fair market value test for assessing
the value of property which was stolen but not destroyed.
Applying this test to the facts of this case, it is
apparent that the willing buyer, the drawee bank, would
(and did) pay the willing seller, Allstates Wholesale, the
face amount of $405.76 for the two checks.
As was cogently pointed out by the prosecutor
in her closing argument, prudent people do not endorse
checks until immediately before negotiation.

If appellant's

argument were to be followed, relative impunity would be
extended to thieves who steal unendorsed commercial paper.
If the thief

could successfully forge the endorsement and

negotiate a check, he would net the face amount; if caught
with only unendorsed stolen checks, he could avoid felony
prosecution.

Appellant's own witness, Ms. Vrabec, testified

on cross-examination that the value of the checks to Allstate
"prior to processing" was the face amount of the instruments

(T.50).

Respondent submits that the face amount of the

checks in this case was the proper measure of value and constituted
competent evidence upon which the jury could convict
appellant of a third degree felony.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON APPELLANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
A substantial amount of time at trial was
spent in considering appellant's theory of value of the
two checks at issue.

In support of his contention that

the checks had no value at the time they were stolen,
appellant submitted the following proposed instruction:
When the value of property alleged
to have been taken by theft must be
determined, the market value at the time
and in the locality of the theft shall
be the test.
The value is the highest
price, estimated in terms of money, for
which the property would have sold in
the open market at the time and in the
locality, if the owner was desirous of
selling, but under no urgent necessity
of doing so, and if the buyer was desirous
of buying but under no urgent necessity
of doing so, and if the seller had a
reasonable time within which to find a
purchaser, and the buyer had knowledge of
the character of the property and of the
uses to which it might be put.
(R. 88).

The trial court rejected appellant's proposed
instruction and submitted Instruction No.
Instruction No.

22

(R.55) and

23 (R.56) to the jury:
INSTRUCTION NO. 22

You may find that a check is a writing
which represents value to the owner.
In
determining the amount of value of a check,
you may consider the written face value of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

check and the testimony of competent
witnesses as to the value of the check.
(emphasis added).
INSTRUCTION NO. 23
When the value of property alleged
to have been taken by Theft must be
determined, the measure of the value is
its fair market value at the time and place
of the Theft.
You are instructed that the owner of an
article is a competent witness as to its
value and any such expression of opinion
may be considered by you in determining
value. (emphasis added).
This Court has stated that, "The trial court
should mold the instructions to fit the facts shown, using
language understood by lay people and blend the instructions
to the facts disclosed by the evidence and make them as clear
in meaning and concise as possible without requiring belabored
legal definitions."
396 P.2d 414, 416

State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102,

(1964).

Respondent maintains that Instruc-

tions 22 and 23 are concise and clear and adequately instruct
the jury on appellant's argument concerning value.

In

Instruction No. 22, the alleged relevance of the testimony
of appellant's expert witness, Ms. Vrabec, is understood by
the language referring to the "testimony of competent
witnesses."

The fair market value theory as well as the

important of the time the theft occurred (relevant to the
issue of endorsements) urged by appellant are plainly stated
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in Instruction No. 23.

The trial court was not required to

accept the precise language of appellant's proposed
instruction.

Moreover, the instructions, when read as a

whole, adequately instructed the jury.
17 Utah 2d 418, 413 P.2d 805 (1966).

State v. Burch,
The trial court's

rejection of appellant's proposed instruction should be
affirmed.
POINT III
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 AND INSTRUCTION NO, 22
WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
A

APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
OBJECT TO THE SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS BY FAILING TO RECORD HIS
EXCEPTIONS THERETO AT TRIAL.
In State v. Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190, 193 (Utah 1976),
this Court approved the "standard rule" that a failure to
object to an instruction at trial precludes the raising
of the issue on appeal.

At the stipulated time for

exceptions to instructions, counsel for appellant lodged

a single exception to Instruction No. 13, and failed to
object to Instruction No. 18 or Instruction No.

22 (T.74).

Because of the failure to enter a timely exception, appellant
may not raise the alleged error of the instructions as an
issue on appeal.
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B

EVEN IF APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE
HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE
INSTRUCTIONS, THE INSTRUCTIONS
AT ISSUE WERE CORRECT AND PROPERLY
SUBMITTED.
Instruction No. 18 reads as follows:
You have been instructed regarding
the essential elements of the crime of
theft which the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The State need only
prove those essential elements.
In other words, in the crime of Theft,
it is not necessary for the State to prove
and you are not to consider in your
deliberations, whether the checks had
any value to the person who took them
from the owner.
(R.51).
The obvious function of Instruction No. 18 is to emphasize
that it is the value of the stolen property to the owner
that determines the true value.

See:

State v. Logan, supra.

The soundness of this proposition is admitted by counsel for
appellant in her colloquy with Judge Conder at trial (T.30-31).
Appellant's citation to Section 76-6-101(4) (a),

(b) and (c)

is misdirected and has no relevance to the propriety of
Instruction No. 18.
Appellant's objection to Instruction No. 22 is
equally unavailing.

The language of Instruction No. 22

merely directs the attention of the jury to the evidence
presented by the state ("face value of the check", i.e.,
the checks themselves) and the ·evidence presented by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellant ("testimony of competent witnesses," i.e., Ms.
Vrabec).

The language of the instruction hardly "distorts

the law by weighting the testimony of the State's witness
and giving no legal credit to the evidence that appellant
presented."

(Brief of Appellant at 11).
The assessment of the value of the checks was

a question of fact for the jury and Instruction No. 22
correctly highlighted the competent evidence which could
be considered in reaching their verdict.
PO.INT IV
THE COMMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR DURING
FINAL REBUTTAL WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL
AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
A

APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
RAISE AN OBJECTION ON APPEAL BY
FAILING TO OBJECT AT TRIAL.
Before appellant can object to the allegedly
prejudicial comment of the prosecutor on appeal, he must
have preserved his right to do so by lodging an objection
at trial.

State v. White, 577 P.2d 552

(Utah 1978).

White, this Court stated,
If counsel desires to object and
preserve his record as to such an error
during argument, he must call it to the
attention of the trial court so that
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In

if he thinks that it is necessary and
appropriate to do so, he will have an
opportunity to rectify any error
or impropriety therein and obviate the
necessity of an entire new trial. (citation
omitted).
Id. at 555.
P.2d 1398

Accord:

(1971).

State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485

Appellant failed to object to the

prosecutor's statement and, therefore, cannot raise the
issue in this appeal.
B

EVEN IF APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE
HIS RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF
ALLEGED PREJUDICIAL COMMENT, THE
PROSECUTOR'S REMARK WAS PROPER.
A prosecutor has the right and a duty to analyze
the evidence as a whole and to include any statements or
deductions reasonably to be drawn from such evidence.
State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949
569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977).

(Utah 1975); State v. Eaton,
The prosecutor is also given

"wide discretion and is entitled to exercise considerable
freedom in expressing to the jury his view of the evidence."
State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530

(1973).

Appellant cites the case of State v. Valdez,
30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422

(1973), in support of his

argument concerning asserted prejudicial comment.

Respondent

concurs with the controlling test stated therein, with
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special emphasis on the necessity that the remarks must
call the attention of the jurors to matters which they
would not be justified in considering.

In the instant

case, the prosecutor merely referred to the testimony
of the state's principal witness, Mr. Charles Fultz.
Having heard Mr. Fultz testify in the State's case in
chief, the jury's attention was simply recalled to the
substance of his testimony.
Respondent maintains that the remark of Ms.
Strachan was not so prejudicial as to constitute
reversible error.

In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah

1977), cited by appellant, the prosecutor at trial stressed
that the defendant had not taken the stand to testify on
his own behalf and stated, "I listened to the entire defense
in this case and never heard one shred of evidence from the
defendant to prove any motive any reason that showed that
Ken Goode was out to get blacks in this community."
at 1115.

Id.

In condemning the prosecutor's remarks, this

Court stated,
Upon a fair analysis of the
prosecutor's remarks here, the
conclusion cannot be escaped that it
was but a thinly disguised attempt to
do indirectly what the prosecutor knew
could not properly be done directly:
that is, to comment on the fact that the
defendant had chosen not to take the
witness stand; and to persuade the jury
to draw inferences as to his guilt because
of his exercise of that constitutional
privilege.
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The remarks in Eaton infringed upon a constitutional right of the defendant; in this case, no such
prejudice exists.

While the transcript does not include

the closing argument of Ms. Fletcher, it seems clear that
Ms. Strachan's remark was in direct response to something
contained in defense counsel's argument.

The comment of

the prosecutor was apparently spontaneous and not calculated
to prejudice the appellant.
If every statement by a prosecutor in closing
argument were to be subjected to such close scrutiny, the
legitimate right of the state to place its view of the
evidence before the jury would be severely curtailed.

The

comment in the instant case did not improperly influence
the jury and does not constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the finding
of the trial court that the face amount of a check is
prima facie evidence of its value.

Such a rule would

further sound public policy and is solidly supported by
case law.
Appellant's remaining claims of error are
~ithout

substance, and the failure of counsel for appellant

to enter timely objections at trial precludes appellant
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from raising the majority of the issues on appeal.

The

verdict of the jury should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CURTIS J. DRAKE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Ms. Ginger L. Fletcher,
Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association,
333 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
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